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 The public sphere is in the work of Jürgen Habermas conceived as a neutral 
social space for critical debate among private persons who gather to discuss mat-
ters of common concern in a free, rational and in principle disinterested way. 
Praised as a normative ideal – especially by the advocates of participatory democ-
racy – and criticised as a working model, the concept of the public sphere has 
triggered many controversies.  
 The first part of this paper examines the usefulness of the concept by accent-
ing the procedural value of its central category – the rational-critical debate. As-
suming that the rational public debate is possible and assessing it as highly en-
riching for democracy, the second part questions the potential of the media to pro-
vide a forum for it. 
 Although Habermas himself saw the media as contributing to the decay of the 
rational-critical discourse and causing the decline of the public sphere, numerous 
revisions of the concept, quite the contrary, have recognized the capacity of the 
media to initiate public discussion and give it a constructive spin. Hopes are high 
regarding the public service broadcasting and its principle of universal access. The 
Internet offers a range of still unexplored possibilities. 
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 The notion of the bourgeois public sphere, celebrated in the works of Jürgen Haber-
mas, inspired the long running discussion, still one of the most popular among the ex-
perts and academics in the fields of the media and politics.  
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 The public sphere is in the work of Jürgen Habermas conceived as a social space for 
the ‘rational-critical debate about public issues conducted by private persons willing to 
let arguments and not statuses determine decisions’ (Calhoun, 1992: 1). Praised as a 
normative ideal – especially by the advocates of participatory democracy – and criti-
cised as a working model – the concept of the public sphere triggered many controver-
sies. In this essay I will focus mainly on its central category – rational-critical debate. I 
will assume that the rational public debate is possible and I will value it as highly en-
riching for democracy. However, because of the space limitations, I will not closely 
elaborate on the categories of rational or public but rather concentrate on its procedural 
value and the potential settings for its implementation. 
 I will first expound Habermas’s notion of the bourgeois public sphere. Then I will 
focus on its critique and revisions, especially on those accounts questioning homoge-
nous and singular character of the public sphere and consensus as the likely outcome of 
the debate. I will also briefly refer to the critical voices of those who find this concept of 
the public sphere utopian and Habermas’s vision of the 18th and 19th century public life 
idealistic.  
 Since the idea of the public sphere is closely related to the model of deliberative de-
mocracy, I will try to briefly explain the procedural value of deliberation and the fea-
tures of the public debate as its central category.  
 In the second part of the essay, I will examine the potential of the media to initiate 
public debate and provide a forum for it. Public service broadcasting, television debate 
and the Internet will be examined more closely. 
 In contrast to Habermas’s idealistic notion of the bourgeois public sphere and the 
critical view of the declined and distorted contemporary public sphere, I will argue that 
it is exactly today that ‘ordinary people’ have much better access to public discussion 
than ever before.  
 
Habermas’s concept of the public sphere  
 Directed against the absolute will of monarchs, the bourgeois public sphere emerged 
in the 18th century as a neutral social space independent of the public authority and 
‘made up of private people gathering together as a public and articulating the needs of 
society with the state’ (Habermas in Calhoun, 1992: 21). These private citizens debated 
matters of common interest in ‘a free, rational and (in principle) disinterested way’ 
(Curran, 2000: 134).  
 Based on, as Curran (1996) suggests, ‘idealized’ notion of the bourgeois public 
sphere, Habermas developed a normative model of the public sphere as ‘a realm of our 
social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed’ (Habermas, 
1974: 49). Access to all citizens, as Habermas argues, must be guaranteed. ‘A portion of 
the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals 
assemble to form a public body’, contends Habermas (ibid.: 49). This ‘public body’ is 
constituted when citizens ‘confer in an unrestricted fashion – that is, with the guarantee 
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of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their 
opinions – about matters of general interest’ (ibid.: 49). 
 Public opinion, as Habermas uses it here, is not the one that reflects ‘“mere opinion” 
(or arbitrary views) of isolated individuals taken in the aggregate’ (Calhoun, 1992: 17) – 
today most commonly expressed in opinion polls. The genuine public opinion instead 
‘comes to refer more positively to the views held by those who join in rational-critical 
debate on an issue’ (ibid.: 17).  
 The public sphere depends both upon the quality of discourse and the quantity of 
participation. This means that not only should discussion be constituted ‘around rational 
critical argument’ (Calhoun, 1992: 2) but ‘the more people participate as citizens in 
politics, the closer one comes to the ideal of a public sphere’ (Schudson, 1992: 147).  
 However, Habermas’s demand for equal and unrestricted participation is in a way 
paradoxical. The bourgeois public sphere in its early days was reserved mainly for edu-
cated propertied men. Its character was therefore ‘exclusionary’ (Calhoun, 1992: 3). The 
inclusion of other social groups occurred gradually contributing to the openness of the 
public sphere but at the same time introducing ‘degeneration in the quality of the dis-
course’ (ibid.: 3). 
 The real decline of the public sphere and its ‘structural transformation’, according to 
Habermas (1989), came with the mass consumption and commodification of culture that 
was reinforced by the media. Personalized accounts of politics have been diminishing 
public readiness to take part in critical debates while the new public relations industry 
‘engineers consent among the consumers of mass culture’ (Calhoun, 1992: 24). Accla-
mation, fears Habermas, not critical discourse is what became important (Calhoun, 
1992: 26).  
 The media turn active citizens into passive spectators constructing a pseudo-public 
sphere: ‘the world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere by appearance only’ 
(Habermas, 1989: 171 in Calhoun, 1992: 23). Television’s appeal to emotions and the 
readiness of the press to adapt to the commercial rules of the market caused decay of the 
critical discourse. 
 
Public sphere revised  
 The critique of the Habermasian concept of the public sphere amounts to a bulky 
volume of pages pointing to different aspects of it. I will concentrate here on the two 
elements I find most controversial: the homogeneity of the unitary public sphere and the 
consensus as the likely outcome of the debate.  
 Habermas’s notion of a singular public sphere has been criticized as a utopian ideal 
that does not consider the differences among those who participate in it (Sturken and 
Cartwright, 2001). The presumption of homogeneity and a potential to reach consensus 
underlie his concept. However, discussions among citizens or different social groups 
may not reach consensus but rather introduce diversity of opinions and views. Living-
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stone and Lunt (1994) introduce the ‘oppositional public sphere’ as possible solution. It 
doesn’t aim for consensus but a ‘negotiated compromise’ (ibid: 26).  
 John Kean (2000: 60) writes about ‘differently sized, overlapping, and intercon-
nected public spheres’ that vary in nature. He distinguishes between the ‘micro-public 
spheres’ that operate at the sub-nation-state level, the ‘meso-public spheres’ that gather 
people at the nation-state level and the ‘macro-public spheres’ that have a global, supra-
national character.  
 Nancy Fraser (1990: 59, as quoted in Livingstone and Lunt, 1994: 24), argues that 
the public is ‘fragmented into a mass of competing interest groups’. Instead of one pub-
lic, there are now many that overlap and work in tension with each other (in Sturken and 
Cartwright, 2001).  
 Calhoun (1992: 37) suggests that it might be more productive to think of the ‘public 
sphere as involving a field of discursive connections’. Within this field, according to 
Calhoun, intensive communication among certain parts would establish clusters that 
may be organized ‘around issues, categories, persons or basic dynamics of the larger so-
ciety’ (ibid: 38).  
 The bulk of criticism is directed towards the Habermasian idealistic vision of the 
18th and 19th century public life. The unified public sphere was actually welcoming only 
white men while other social groups were excluded.  
 Michael Schudson (1992: 146) refers to the idea of the eighteen and nineteen cen-
tury public sphere of ‘rational-critical discourse’ as ‘inadequate and incoherent’ (at least 
in America). James Curran (2000: 139) looks back to the liberal belief that society is 
homogenous and harmonious and that conflicts may be resolved through the application 
of reason, which he believes, is an idealist vision.  
 For reasons of space, I shall set aside the critiques addressing the category of ra-
tional. The most rational argument, argues Scannell (1989: 159), meaning rhetorically 
most convincing, doesn’t necessarily lead to the best solution. He calls for ‘reasonable’ 
instead, as it has the force of the ‘mutually accountable behaviour’ that presupposes co-
operation, that is, a ‘willingness to listen, to allow the validity of the other person’s 
viewpoint and if necessary, a willingness to leave aside what may be the best argument’. 
This is, however, to be discussed elsewhere.  
 Does this all mean that the idea of the public sphere, that once might have actually 
existed, should be disregarded? Not at all. This only means that Habermas’s concept of 
the bourgeois public sphere is to be evaluated from the perspective of its historical con-
text. Despite the fact that some features of the bourgeois public sphere seem unaccept-
able for modern democracies, e.g. its exclusionary character, contemporary analyses 
should recognize how progressive it was at that time. From the perspective of democ-
ratic legitimacy, one of the biggest values of the bourgeois public sphere at the time of 
its emergence was that ‘practical reason was institutionalized through norms of rea-
soned discourse in which arguments, not status or traditions, were to be decisive’ (Cal-
houn, 1992: 2). It was ‘the best rational argument and not the identity of the speaker’ 
(ibid.: 13) that mattered.  
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 However, all the reflections on the contemporary public sphere should recognize the 
momentum of ‘modernization’ characterised by an ‘increasing social complexity’ 
(Swanson and Mancini, 1996: 9) and a growing fragmentation.  
 Even Habermas in his more recent work1 attempts to revise the original concept ac-
cording to the existing social circumstances. The notion of the single public coming to-
gether to discuss matters of general interest and for the sake of common good is now 
being replaced by the idea of a ‘more differentiated, pluralistic and organized’ public 
sphere with ‘public interest groups’ and ‘radical professionals’ as key players who 
‘identify, draw attention to and interpret social problems, and propose solutions’ 
(Curran, 2000: 136).  
 
Deliberative democracy and the public debate 
 In order to stress the importance of the public sphere as ‘an idea which calls for a ra-
tionalization of power through the medium of public discussion among private indi-
viduals’ (Habermas, 1974: 55), I’ll briefly refer to the model of deliberative democracy. 
 Thomas Christiano (1997: 243) defines deliberative democracy as a concept in 
which ‘democratic decision making ought to be grounded in a substantial process of 
public deliberation, wherein arguments for and against laws and policies are given in 
terms of whether they advance the common good of the citizens and the justice of the 
political society’. According to the theorists of deliberative democracy – and in Haber-
mas’s view – the result of the public deliberation is ‘uncoerced consensus ‘ (Habermas 
in Bohman, 1996: 26). As mentioned earlier, this raises one concern. What if the final 
output is likely to be unbridgeable disagreement or increased diversity of opinions 
rather than consensus?  
 Christiano suggests (ibid.: 244 – 245) that the value of public deliberation is not to 
be looked for only in the results but in the procedure as well. This means that each deci-
sion is subject to critical debate which is a value in itself since in the course of it delib-
erating citizens build mutual respect and concern. The results are in this case justified 
by the procedure itself, because they are brought about ‘in a certain way’ (Christiano, 
1997: 246). 
 Similarly, Bohman (1996: 27) argues that ‘the best defence of public deliberation is 
that it is more likely to improve the epistemic quality of the justification for political de-
cisions. When deliberation is carried out in an open public forum, the quality of the rea-
sons is likely to improve’.  
 This procedural perspective, however, does not say when we can judge the process 
of deliberation as successful. Bohman (1996: 33) suggests that success is not to be 
measured ‘by the strong requirement’, that is, by a general agreement but ‘by the 
weaker requirement’ that is that the participants are convinced to the extent they are 
willing to continue with the dialogue.  
 
1 ‘Further Reflections on the Public Sphere’ (1992) in C. Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
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 In other words, deliberation may be considered successful if all citizens involved in 
a public debate are addressed as equal, if the arguments are expounded in such a way 
that ‘any other citizen might be able to understand them, accept them, and freely re-
spond to them on his or her own terms’ (Bohman, 1996: 26) and if the ‘participants in 
the joint activity recognize that they have contributed to and influenced the outcome, 
even when they disagree with it’ (Bohman, 1996: 33).  
 Through the concept of deliberative democracy I have tried to briefly explain the im-
portance, procedural value and some of the features of the public debate as its central 
category. I will not go any deeper into discussing deliberation as a governing ideal since 
it falls beyond the scope of this essay. However, the question I would like to bring up at 
this point is related to the public sphere as the setting for public debates and “the social 
space necessary for democratic deliberation”, (Bohman, 1996: 37). Where is this space 
to be located in the complex, modern society and what are its features? 
 
Media as a public debate forum 
 Habermas, in his concept of the public sphere and the critique of its structural trans-
formation, tends to overlook the potential of the mass media to contribute to the public 
debate by providing a platform for it or by initiating discussions about matters of gen-
eral concern.  
 The media are, on the contrary, seen as distorting the public sphere and providing 
only a false impression of it.  
 His work, however, started an avalanche of accounts and debates about the ‘norma-
tive conception of the contemporary public sphere as a neutral space within society, free 
of both state and corporate control in which the media should make available informa-
tion affecting the public good and facilitate a free, open and reasoned public dialogue’ 
(Curran, 2000: 135). The question that underlies many of them, as Livingstone and Lunt 
(1994: 9) put it, is ‘How far do the mass media provide a public sphere in which citizens 
may debate issues in a democratic forum and in which those in power may be held ac-
countable to the public?’.  
 The media facilitate public discussions by providing a technological and structural 
forum and, which is even more important, by initiating public discussions and setting 
the agenda for it. Although this demand for agenda setting may seem unpopular in the 
light of the political and economical interests that may be driving it, without ‘limiting 
debate, defining issues, and restricting alternatives, no debate can be rational’ (Schud-
son, 1992: 156). An unstructured flow of thoughts leads nowhere. ‘It has to be a small 
set of identifiable, branching alternatives that can be examined reasonably enough one 
at the time’, argues Schudson (ibid.: 156).  
 I will focus more closely on the potential of the public service broadcasting (as op-
posed to the commercial broadcasting), television debate and the Internet to facilitate 
and initiate a public debate.  
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Public service broadcasting 
 In contrast with Habermas who sees television as the cause of the decline of the pub-
lic sphere, researchers such as Paddy Scannell and Nicholas Garnham argue that it was 
actually the public service broadcasting that brought the public sphere into existence. 
The commercial media, on the other hand, have been significantly contributing to the 
decline of the public sphere.  
 Recognizing the public service broadcasting as an ‘imperfect realization’ of Haber-
mas’s ideal, Garnham (in Keane, 2000: 55) argues that it is the closest that the modern 
society can come to establishing a ‘space for a rational and universalistic politics dis-
tinct from both economy and the state’.  
 Scannell (1989: 136) contends that the public service broadcasting has ‘unobtru-
sively contributed to the democratization of everyday life’. The fundamental commit-
ment of the public service broadcasting is its universal availability, unlike the commer-
cial broadcasters whose primary interest is profit.  
 The public service broadcasting, according to Scannell, not only enabled universal 
access to broadcasted programme but gradually came to represent all social groups. It 
has not always been that any subject can be given airtime. The media agenda has been 
changing slowly, fighting resistance and pressure. Today’s broadcasting ‘Came to fulfil 
... its role as an independent public sphere, as a forum for open discussion of matters of 
general concern’ (ibid.: 145). 
 Before the rise of the public service broadcasting, public events had restricted access 
and were not available to everyone. Broadcasting brought general public into existence: 
‘public life was equalized in a way that had never before been possible’ (ibid.: 140)  
 The mixture of the content guaranteed by the public service broadcasting is endan-
gered by “generic programming in which all the material in a particular channel is of the 
same kind” (ibid.: 139). Generic programming fragments the general public into the 
taste public that is easily seduced by advertisers. Furthermore, once information turns 
from the public good into a private commodity, society will be polarised into the infor-
mation rich and the information poor – not everybody will be able to afford access to in-
formation. Commercial broadcasting, therefore, occurs as a threat to the general access 
and the mixture of the content. The process of ‘decommodification’, as Kean (2000: 56) 
paraphrases Garnham, can happen only through the public service broadcasting.  
 Scannell criticises the work of Stuart Hall and other media critics that perceive all 
broadcasting as manipulative and supportive of the dominant ‘economic and political 
institutions and processes, and of existing structures of class, gender and ethnic relations 
in capitalist societies’ (Hall et al. 1980; Hall, 1977, 1982 as quoted in Scannell, 1989: 
156). The ‘ideological effect’ thesis is a ‘one dimensional critique’ that reads all outputs 
of broadcasting in the same way, argues Scannell (ibid.: 157).  
 Habermas’s concept of the general public has encountered heavy criticism just like 
his idea of the unified public. Listing the main problems the public service broadcasting 
has been faced with today – such as the questions of financing, legitimacy and techno-
logical change in the light of the rapid expansion of cable and satellite television and 
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computer networks – Keane (2000: 58) warns that television will have to undergo the 
process of ‘the gradual recognition of the fragmentation of mass audiences into different 
taste public’ as radio did years ago. By which standards can one indeed measure the 
taste of the general public? The idea that the commercial broadcasting encourages plu-
ralism through its multiple choice of specialized programmes, rather than endangers 
democratic principles by widening the gap between the rich and the poor, is also worth 
giving a second thought. 
 
Television debate 
 In the light of the controversy between the public service broadcasting and the com-
mercial media, it may be useful to take a look at the television debate as a genre that 
may epitomize the idea of people getting together to discuss matters of general interest. 
It is present both in the public service and the commercial sectors – but with different 
aims and effects. 
 According to Habermas (1992: 164, in Örnebring, 2003: 504), television debates are 
only a semblance of public discussion but in reality they are consumer-oriented and 
harmful for the concept of the public sphere.  
 Örnebring (2003) describes how current affairs debate programs in Sweden have 
been continuously changing. It is interesting to take a look how the role of hosts and ex-
perts has been shifting in line with an increased participation of lay public. It is also 
worth noting how the nature of the genre has been gradually changing. In the first stage, 
the so called ‘courteous public debate’ (1956 – 1967), the programs were hosted mainly 
by politicians, representatives of different interest groups, media experts and academics, 
and the discussion was likely to end with a consensus. Lay participants in these debates 
were uncommon. The role of television in the public sphere was seen to be ‘mainly edu-
cational’ (ibid: 511). The ‘critical public debate’ (1968–83) marked the second stage 
which welcomed lay people as active participants. Journalists appeared as mediators 
between the experts and the studio audiences whom they often approached in a patron-
izing way. ‘The orientation towards consensus was replaced by an orientation towards 
conflict and confrontation’, notes Örnebring (ibid: 513). The ‘popular public debate’ of 
the third period (1984–96) started appreciating conflict not for the sake of criticism but 
for the sake of high ratings and attracting audience. The role of the host became central. 
They were given celebrity status. The issues ranged from trivia to high politics. Contro-
versy was celebrated just for the sake of it. The genre was totally subjugated to com-
mercial rules of the market, although lay people gained better access to the programme 
than ever before. It is hard here not to recall the Habermasian paradox of the inversed 
reciprocity between the extended participation and the quality of the discourse and his 
arguments about the decline of the public sphere.  
 However, other accounts about the genre point out different effects. Sturken and 
Cartwright (2001: 182) for example believe that different television debate programmes 
contribute to the public sphere in that they ‘create a forum for contemporary issues and 
thus promote the formation of public spheres’.  
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 For Sonia Livingstone and Peter Lunt (1994: 101) participatory programming, such 
as audience discussion programs, has the potential to construct a particular relationship 
between the lay participants and the experts: ‘Both are presented as interested parties 
but as knowing different things in different ways’. They analyse the changes in the set-
ting of these programs that bridge the gap between the alleged incompetence of ‘ordi-
nary people’ and the elitism of experts. These changes range from technical things, such 
as the seating arrangement (the experts are seated among the studio audience, instead on 
a raised platform) to the structure of the program, which became rather loose, and the 
role of the host who tends to address the studio audience in a more sympathetic manner 
and is more hostile, more provocative towards the experts. This type of programme en-
courages formation of the critical discourse and consensus in the public, bridging the 
communication gap between the ‘life-world’ and the ‘system world’, something that 
also Habermas has been striving for.  
 
Internet 
 The growth of the Internet and its rapid expansion has led to extensive researches of 
the possible implications it might have for democracy. The bulk of it has been address-
ing interactivity as the main element to change the nature of citizens’ participation in 
politics and public life in general. The advocates of the so-called ‘electronic democracy’ 
(Street, 2001: 214) argue that the Internet may either improve the existing form of de-
mocracy or revive the ancient form of direct democracy. Summarizing the arguments 
for electronic democracy, Street (2001: 217) notes that the Internet may offer solutions 
for the problems that have been obstructing political participation – ‘time, size, knowl-
edge and access’. The Internet has overcome the boundaries of time and space and it is 
no longer necessary for citizens to be physically present to contribute to a discussion. 
The limited political knowledge of ordinary citizens and the unequal distribution of re-
sources, which has been hampering their capacity to get involved in the process of de-
liberation (ibid.: 217) may no longer be a problem. 
 The Internet has been recognized as a platform for public deliberation and the solu-
tion for other problems modern democracy may encounter: ‘The net seems to provide a 
way around the practical problems posed by democracy, whatever its form; citizens can 
exercise their vote, deliberate on public policy or participate directly’ (ibid.: 218).  
 Curran refers to Negroponte (1996, in Curran, 2000: 137) who thinks of cyberspace 
as generating a new world order based on international communication and popular em-
powerment. Keane (2000: 67) suggest that the ‘internet stimulates the growth of macro 
public spheres’ (Keane, 2000: 67) since one segment of the world population uses the 
Internet to ‘generate controversies’ (ibid: 67) about matters of common concern with 
other members of the virtual community. It is the forum for discussion or interaction 
between the members of special interest groups, ad hoc pressure groups or cyber pro-
testers. Websites provide infrastructure for deliberation, which may eventually lead to 
real actions. In that, sense, the Internet opens up some options for the development of 
the international civil society.  
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 However, the critique of the electronic democracy rests on diametrically opposite as-
sumptions: ‘democracy involves deliberation and dialogue in the formation of collective 
goals, rather than the aggregation of individual preferences’ (ibid.: 219). And the Inter-
net is all about registering preferences. People in most parts of the world do not have 
access to it, while the very idea of electronic participation is based on the assumption of 
the universal and cheap access (Street, 2001: 220). Furthermore, Curran (2000: 137) ar-
gues that the fastest-growing branch of the Internet is e-commerce which only shows 
that the relations of power shape new technologies and not the other way around.  
 What dstinguishes the Internet from the other media, besides its basic technological 
characteristic, is its rather unstructured form of communication and the absence of me-
diators which is an issue of great controversy when, for instance, television discussion 
programs are addressed. 
 Despite the professional, technological and structural constraints and the need to ad-
just to the rules of the market – which sometimes proves not to be particularly reward-
ing for the quality of discussion – the media have the potential to facilitate public dis-
cussion.  
 Curran (2000: 141) hopes that democratic media can bridge the gap between the 
fragmented social groups and the universally shared arena of general discourse. The 
specialist media sector should cater for different audiences and enable them to debate 
issues of ‘social identity, group interest, political strategy and normative understanding 
on their own terms’ (ibid.: 140). These media should foster discussion within multiple 
and mutually overlapping public spheres. The general media sector should reach the 
general, heterogeneous public in such a way that ‘different groups in society come to-
gether and engage in reciprocal debate’ (ibid.: 141). The general media should be sensi-
tive to public initiatives and pursue response from governments if the civil sector re-
quires it.  
 
Conclusion 
 The public sphere is an ideal model that has probably never existed. As Calhoun 
(1992: 39) remarks: ‘Habermas constitutes historical category of the public sphere and 
attempts to draw from it a normative ideal’. This normative ideal of an independent so-
cial space where private citizens join in a rational-critical debate to discuss matters of 
common interest has been scrutinized as a working model. Doubts has been raised about 
its singular and homogenous nature, rationality of arguments, quality of discourse and 
the probability that debate will reach a consensus.  
 Critics have been also attacking the historical category of the bourgeois public 
sphere of the 18th and 19th century. They have been pointing out its exclusionary char-
acter. However, despite the problematic elements from the perspective of contemporary 
democracies, critics should recognize its progressive nature at that time. For instance, 
the idea that the power of the rational argument should enjoy primacy over the status 
and the identity of the speaker. Hence, to properly judge the bourgeois public sphere, it 
should be examined within its own historical context.  
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 Numerous revisions of Habermas’s concept lead to different accounts about the 
multiple, mutually overlapping public spheres, accounts that recognize the complexity 
of the modern society. Some of these accounts recognize the media as a chance for the 
public sphere. Habermas thinks they have been contributing to its decline. The quality 
of the debate has been damaged by the commodification of culture and the commer-
cialization of the discourse.  
 In contrast with this critical view about the distorted contemporary public sphere, it 
is claimed that it is exactly today that the ‘ordinary people’ have a much better access to 
public discussion than ever before. Habermas’s concept seems paradoxical: he wants 
everybody to participate but this damages the quality of discussion.  
 In modern democracies the media do have the potential to initiate public debate and 
provide a forum for it. The features of this mediated public sphere and the role of jour-
nalism, lay public and experts within that sphere, depend on the notion of the role of the 
media in democracy. A significant contribution to the public sphere lies in the capacity 
of the media to structure public discussion and give it a constructive spin. High hopes 
are entertained regarding the public service broadcasting and its principle of universal 
access as opposed to the commercial media with their generic programming. The Inter-
net offers a range of still unexplored possibilities. 
 The concept of the public sphere and the model of deliberative democracy are 
inseparable What underlies them is the rational-critical debate. Its biggest value lies in 
the procedure itself. Each decision is a subject of a critical debate, which is a value in it-
self, and the results are justified by the procedure.  
 Habermas’s notion of the public sphere, despite all its features that simply lack the 
sense of reality, is a wonderful contribution to the theory of the human society: people 
are encouraged to participate in a process of deliberation and access is guaranteed to 
everybody; they are respected as equals and are expected to behave in a disinterested 
way contributing to the common good; power elites are held accountable to the inde-
pendent public body.  
 Hence, if we find the model of deliberative democracy rewarding, if we think of the 
reasonable public debate as contributing to the ultimate goal of democracy – the biggest 
happiness for the greatest number of people – then we certainly must recognize the 
normative concept of the public sphere – together with its numerous adaptations and 
modification – as useful. The real challenge for democracy is how to measure up to this 
ideal as much as possible. 
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